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Abstract
We study market equilibration in laboratory economies that are larger and more com-
plex than any that have been studied experimentally to date. Complexity is derived from
the fact that the economies are international in economic structure with multiple input,
output, and foreign exchange markets in operation. The economies have twenty-one
markets and due to the fact that they have roughly fty agents, the economies are char-
acterized by several hundred equations. In spite of the complexity and interdependence
of the economy, the results demonstrate the substantial power of the general equilib-
rium model of perfect competition to predict the direction of movement of market-level
variables. Empirical patterns in the convergence process are explored and described.
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Under the classical competitive equilibrium model, the simultaneous optimization 
by all participants in the economy, given prices, incentives, resources, and technology 
constraints, implies an outcome corresponding to a solution of a system of nonlinear 
excess demand equations. The number of such equations explodes as the number of 
commodities and resources increase, but the theory itself suggests no effects of the 
increased complexity. On the surface, the thought that a decentralized system of 
competitively interacting humans might approximate the solution as the number of 
equations grows large is a staggering and contentious proposition that many cannot 
believe without demonstration. The substance of this paper is a demonstration that 
equilibration is not beyond the capacity of a large economic system and that the 
principles at work are well approximated by classical general equilibrium theory applied 
to international economies. 
Although the concept of equilibrium is static, part of its allure as a predictive 
model lies in a dynamic interpretation; that the movement of the economic variables will 
be in the direction of the equilibrium of the model.  The empirical relevance of such a 
dynamic interpretation of the model is demonstrated in a growing body of experimental 
work that documents a convergence tendency in markets. That is, in many reported 
experiments, there is a tendency for markets to converge toward the competitive 
equilibria of corresponding theoretical models, and for the market activity to exhibit 
reduced variability in a neighborhood of the equilibrium prices and quantities. In such 
cases, Equilibration, a dynamic principle of system behavior, underlies the support for 
the law of supply and demand. This convergence generalizes to a wide class of 
experimental economies, such as production economies with derived demand 
(Goodfellow and Plott, 1990; Plott and George, 1983), exchange economies with two or 
more commodities (Forsythe et al. 1980; Plott and Sunder, 1988; Plott, 1988; Bossaerts et 
al. 2001; Plott, 2001; Williams et al., 2001; Chen and Plott, 2001), and small general 
equilibrium systems with a circular flow of income (Lian and Plott, 1998).2    
In this paper we investigate the properties of the equilibration process of 
experimental international market economies. These economies are far more complex 
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2240, USA. E-mail cnoussa@emory.edu. Plott: Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California 
Institute of Technology, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA. E-mail: cplott@hss.caltech.edu. Riezman: Department 
of Economics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, IA 52242, USA. E-mail: raymond-riezman@uiowa.edu.  We 
thank Carol McAusland, Jacob Goeree, Zheng Liu, and seminar participants at Nottingham University, the 
University of Amsterdam, and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology for helpful 
comments. We thank Steven Tucker and Tara Larson for research assistance. 
2 While a dynamic process of price adjustment is in operation, it need not necessarily lead in the direction 
of the competitive equilibrium. The process can be unstable (Plott and George, 1990; Plott and Smith, 
1999; Plott 2000) or cycle without apparent equilibration (Anderson et al., 2003).  
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that any laboratory economies created to date. The complexity is not only in terms of the 
number of commodities, markets and agents, but also in terms of the nature of the 
economic activities and their interdependence. In international economies, special types 
of market interdependencies arise because international demand for traded goods also 
influences derived demand for factors of production. Moreover, exchange rates exert 
direct feedback on all sectors of the economy and the demand and supply of foreign 
exchange are sensitive to various activities throughout the economy. The feasibility of 
studying simpler international economies has been established (Noussair et al., 1995, 
19973; Riedl and van Winden, 2001), together with a presumption that the equilibration 
tendencies of systems of markets will survive in even the most complex of environments.  
In the experiment reported here, the laboratory world is divided into three 
countries, where each country is characterized by its own currency, resource endowment, 
and production technology. There are three final goods, which can be produced in any of 
the three countries. Two input goods, both of which are required to produce any of the 
outputs, reside in each of the three countries. These factors of production are immobile, 
although outputs can be traded internationally. Markets exist for each output, input and 
currency. The simultaneous trade of several types of goods, factors of production, final 
goods, and currencies, provides a rich setting to study the principles of behavior of an 
entire general equilibrium economic system, with interdependencies beyond those that 
have been previously studied experimentally. 
The paper is divided into five sections.  The first section is this introduction. The 
second section describes the experimental environment together with the procedures and 
parameters.  Because this is the first experiment with this level of complexity, section two 
also includes some details about the interfaces and other aspects of the experiment.  The 
third section is a summary of the models and terminology that are used in the results 
section. The analysis is conducted at the aggregate level to identify and explore patterns 
of behavior of economic systems rather than those of individuals. The concept of 
equilibration is expressed in a testable formulation called the Equilibration Hypothesis. 
The hypothesis has two parts: (1) Reduced variability : the variance of the variables in the 
system decreases over time, and (2) Convergence: the values of the variables move in the 
direction of the Competitive Equilibrium values. 
The fourth section describes the results from the experiment and the last section 
presents and discusses the conclusions. After evaluating the equilibration hypothesis, 
which is supported in our data, the empirical characteristics of the equilibration process 
are explored. The behavior of variables such as national production, international trade, 
                                                 
3 Noussair et al. (1995) consider two types of experimental international economies. The first has the 
structure of the Ricardian model, in which there are two countries, two output goods, and one input good. 
In the competitive equilibrium, full specialization by each country in one output is predicted. The authors 
observe convergence to the equilibrium, though input prices are lower than marginal products and tariffs 
reduce efficiency by a greater amount than is consistent with equilibrium comparative statics. The second 
type of economy has two inputs rather than one. Convergence to close to competitive equilibrium is also 
observed, and in both types of economy, trade flows are consistent with the Law of Comparative 
Advantage. While the economies studied in Noussair et al. (1995) have one currency common to both 
countries, Noussair et al. (1997) study experimental international exchange economies with two countries 
and two currencies. They find that trade patterns are consistent with the Law of Comparative Advantage, 
but the exchange rate deviates considerably from the Purchasing Power Parity level.    
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prices, wages, and exchange rates, are studied. Some properties of the equilibration 
process that appear in our data and that we believe are fairly general are identified.  
 
2. The Experiment 
2a. Overview of the Economy 
The economies we constructed all had the structure shown in figure 1. There were 
three countries, A, B, and C. In each country there were agents who were suppliers. 
Suppliers were endowed with the ability to supply two resources, l and k, to input 
markets. In each country there were also agents who were producers. Each producer was 
endowed with a production capability and could produce one of three outputs x, y, and z 
using the inputs l and k. Finally, there were consumers who could purchase x, y, and z 
from producers on the output markets.  
 The final goods x, y, and z could trade freely internationally but the inputs l and k 
could not trade internationally. Each country had its own currency, labeled as A, B, or C, 
and all transactions within a country were required to take place in terms of domestic 
currency. We also imposed the requirement that only domestic currency had value to 
residents of a given country, and at the close of the market period all foreign currency 
was removed from the inventory of all agents.4  
A cash-in-advance constraint was in effect on international transactions. Imports 
into country J could occur only when a resident of country J transported a good into 
country J. It was not possible for a resident of country J to transport goods produced in J 
to country K for sale there. This meant that a prospective purchaser from country K, who 
wished to purchase a good produced in country J, had to obtain currency J before 
international trade could take place. To obtain foreign currency, agents could use 
currency markets that were operating in all three countries. The cash in advance 
constraint ensured that the currency markets would be active if international trade 
occurred.  
The cash-in-advance requirement not only conforms to what is typically actually 
the case in field economies, but is also helpful in terms of experimental design. Without 
this requirement it would be very difficult to precisely determine the equilibrium demand 
for foreign currency and hence, the calculation of predicted equilibrium would be 
problematic. We could have imposed the condition that producers sell to consumers in 
the consumer’s home currency but we are confident that the qualitative results would be 
the same. The only difference would be which agents bear the foreign exchange risk. The 
important point to remember is that foreign exchange risk in experimental economies will 
exist no matter how the experiment is designed. This is because decisions are made 
sequentially and international transactions require introducing currency markets which 
creates an additional decision that agents must make. Thus, regardless of the 
experimental design, there must be agents who must buy and sell foreign currency before 
they know the transaction price and quantity of the commodities they are trading. This 
creates an unavoidable risk.  
                                                 
4 This is done so that the only sources of demand for currency were the importation of goods or intra-period 
speculation in the currency market. It would be interesting to allow foreign exchange to be carried over to 
future periods but this would substantially complicate the experiment since all agents would have a 
speculative motivation to hold currencies over the entire length of the experiment. 
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For the economy to maximize gains from trade, the following pattern of activity 
must occur. Suppliers sell inputs l and k to producers in their own country. Producers 
purchase domestic l and k and use them in the production of the outputs x, y, or z. 
Producers then sell the outputs to domestic and foreign consumers. Consumers purchase 
x, y, and z from domestic and/or foreign producers. To purchase a good from a foreign 
producer the consumer first buys the currency of the country from which he wishes to 
import. Supply of the foreign currency originates from foreign consumers who also wish 
to import goods into their own country.   
 
    [Figure 1: About Here] 
 
2b. Parameters 
Subjects had several sources of incentives. Consumers’ valuations for outputs x, y, 
and z were induced by assigning them exogenous values in terms of domestic currency. If 
a consumer purchased and later consumed a unit at a price below its valuation to him, he 
would earn a profit on the unit. The marginal valuations for an individual consumer for 
the outputs decreased as he consumed more. Suppliers’ costs to supply the inputs l and k 
were also induced.5 They were required to pay a marginal cost for each unit they wished 
to sell, and would make a profit on a unit if the price at which it sold was greater than its 
marginal cost.  
Incentives for consumption activities are denoted as U(x,y,z).  Consumers had 
induced values for the three goods. The utilities were in terms of home currency, which 
would be converted into U.S. dollars at the end of the experiment.  The induced 
preferences of a consumer i, in terms of U.S. dollars, had the form6: 
 
Ui(xi, yi, zi) = αi [βi xi + .5δi (xi )2 + γi yi + .5ηi (yi )2 + κi zi +  .5υi (zi)2]
 (1) 
 
αi is the conversion rate for subject i from the currency of the country in which he resides 
to his final payment in US dollars. The utility function is separable in the three goods and 
quadratic in each of the goods. When presented to subjects, consumer incentives were 
expressed in terms of integer quantities of home currency and marginal utilities, [1/αi] 
[Ui(q) – Ui(q-1)] where q is one of the consumption goods. 
Supplying resources is costly to the supplier and thus enters as a negative in a 
utility calculation. The cost of supplying resources is denoted as C(l,k).  The incentives of 
suppliers are derived from their ability to acquire resources at a cost in terms of home 
currency and sell them for home currency at a profit. The induced cost to a supplier i of 
inputs is quadratic, separable in the two inputs and is approximated with the following 
functional form: 
 
Ci(li, ki) = ϕili + θi(li)2 + μiki + τi(ki)2.              (2) 
 
                                                 
5 The variable names V and W were used in the experiment to refer to the inputs. To facilitate their 
interpretation as factors of production, for purposes of exposition we refer to V as l and W as k. 
6 This is the general form of the utility function. In the actual utility functions we use in the experiment, 
some of these parameters are set to zero for some individuals. 
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Each producer had the capacity to transform the two resources into one of the 
three outputs. This ability to transform goods represents a production capability. By 
purchasing the resources with home currency, producing the output, and selling it for 
home currency, the producer could make a profit in terms of home currency, which 
would later be converted to dollars.  Therefore, producers had an incentive to maximize 
profits in terms of home currency.  Let fJm(k,l) denote the production function of a 
producer in country J for output m. The production function of individual i took the 
form7: 
 
fJmi(k,l) = HJm(li).25(ki).25   (3) 
   
Each participant was assigned one of twelve possible types. The types indicated 
their country of residence, and the incentives and production technologies at their 
disposal. Most types had more than one role as consumer, producer or supplier, although 
no subject was both a producer and a supplier, and no subject was both a producer and a 
consumer of the same good. These restrictions ensured that all inputs used in production 
and all outputs consumed were traded between different individuals so that the price of 
every unit transacted of every good could be measured and recorded. Table 1 contains the 
continuous approximations of the functions of the goods defining each type of agent and 
the number of agents of each type that there were in each experiment. The actual discrete 
parameter functions given to each type are available from the authors. 
 
[Table 1: About Here] 
 
Earnings of each participant i in each period were given by MdFi – MdBi. MdFi is i’s 
holding of domestic currency at the end of the period, while MdBi is the holding of 
domestic currency at the beginning of the period. MdFi – MdBi is equal to Ui(xi,yi,zi) – 
Ci(li,ki) + Ri(x,y,z,l,k,Mf) - Ei(x,y,z,l,k,Mf). Ui(xi,yi,zi) and Ci(li,ki) are included in the final 
total holding of domestic currency, because the value of an individual’s consumption was 
added to his cash balance and the cost of supplying inputs was deducted from his cash 
balance. Ri(x,y,z,l,k,Mf) and Ei(x,y,z,l,k,Mf) are individual i’s revenues from sales to and 
the expenditures on purchases from other agents. All agents were free to purchase and 
resell in any market and therefore could speculate on price changes within a period.  Mf 
denotes foreign currency, which could be bought and sold with domestic currency.  
 
2c. The Interface 
In the experimental economies, 21 markets, in which all subjects could participate 
at all times, were in operation. There were seven markets located in each country. Each 
country contained a market for each of the three outputs x, y, and z, and for each of the 
two inputs l and k. Each country also contained two currency markets. In each currency 
market, domestic currency could be exchanged for one of the two foreign currencies. All 
markets followed continuous double auction rules. The experiment was computerized and 
used the Marketscape platform developed at the California Institute of Technology. The 
computer program was written in PERL and runs on the LINUX operating system. Each 
                                                 
7  Notice that these production functions exhibit decreasing returns to scale. Since the number of firms 
cannot change (entry is not allowed into any industry) in the experiment this causes no problems. 
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subject accessed the markets using a web browser. The principal interface for the subjects 
was the Market Summary Screen, illustrated in figure 2.  
 
    [Figures 2 and 3: About Here] 
 
There was one market screen corresponding to each country and links on the 
bottom of the screen that allowed the user to move between countries. Subjects could 
submit offers to buy or sell by filling out the rightmost portion of the screen. The subject 
specified whether the offer was to buy or sell, the good offered, the number of units, the 
price, and the time period for which the offer was to be available. The order book for 
each good was displayed on a screen that subjects reached if they selected the name of 
the market on their main screen. To accept an offer another participant submitted, an 
agent could select a box next to the offer she was accepting. 
The demand functions of consumers for final goods and the supply functions of 
suppliers for inputs were stationary. Consumers could sell units of x, y, and z to the 
experimenter, and receive cash in return. These sales were considered consumption and 
the cash received for the sale, which was added to the cash balance of the consumer, 
represented the utility of consumption. Similarly, suppliers could purchase units of l and 
k from the experimenter at predetermined prices for resale to producers. The price the 
supplier paid for each unit represented the marginal cost of supplying that unit and was 
deducted from the supplier’s earnings.  
The links at the bottom of the screen illustrated in figure 2 illustrate the 
information available at any time to participants. At any time, subjects could access the 
current offers available to every domestic and foreign market. In addition to being able to 
view all current offers in all markets, they could go to pages that would list their own 
history of offers and a history of transactions for each good for the current and all 
previous periods of the experiment. The latter information was available in both text and 
graphical form. They could also select Announcements and receive public messages from 
the experimenter.8
 A producer’s production function was displayed in the manner shown in figure 3. 
The numbers in the table correspond to the total output that could be produced with given 
quantities of the two inputs within a period. The numbers in the table form an isoquant 
map of the producer’s production function. Production was restricted to integer amounts. 
Over the course of a period, as inputs were used in production, a highlighted cursor 
would track input use from the origin outward. This facilitated the calculation of the 
current marginal product at any point in time. To produce output subjects used another, 
interactive screen that allowed them to calculate hypothetically the quantity they could 
produce with different combinations of inputs before they committed themselves to the 
irreversible production decision. To produce, they typed input quantities in designated 
fields.  
 
2d. The Sessions 
                                                 
8 When the experimenter sent a message to subjects that could be read on the Announcements page, an alert 
appeared on the main screen indicating that there was a new message for the subjects from the 
experimenter.  
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Three independent experiments were conducted. Experiment 1 took place during three 
three-hour sessions on three different days, and experiments 2 and 3 during two four-hour 
sessions on two different days. The same subject took part in all of the sessions that made 
up an individual experiment, but no subject took part in more than one experiment. In 
experiment 1, there were 60 participants, 46 of whom were undergraduates at Purdue 
University and 14 of whom were undergraduates at the California Institute of 
Technology. In experiment 1, all subjects were located in the economics laboratories at 
Purdue University and the California Institute of Technology during the sessions. In 
experiments 2 and 3, there were 40 and 57 subjects, respectively, who were all 
undergraduate students at Caltech. Sessions 2 and 3 were conducted remotely with all 
subjects connecting from outside the laboratory over the Internet using a web browser.  
The experiments consisted of a sequence of periods. All markets were open for 
the entire duration of each period. In each period all values of the parameters were 
reinitialized to the same starting values so that the underlying parameters remained the 
same within each period of a given experiment. Thus, there was no ability to carry over 
inventories or to accumulate capital from period to period. Experiment 1 consisted of 12 
periods and experiments 2 and 3 consisted of 16 periods. Each period was between 20 
and 30 minutes in length. The time remaining in the current period was always common 
knowledge. 
 
2e. Competitive equilibrium 
Application of the model of perfect competition can be used to produce market 
demand functions for each commodity in each country. These are themselves complex, 
being derived from individual maximization theory, inverted and summed across agents. 
Thus, the summary equations in this subsection represent a major simplification of the 
economic environment that existed. 
  The demand functions of individual consumers for the three outputs in each of the 
three countries were discrete approximations of functions of the form dmJ(pmJ) = amJ - bmJ 
* pmJ, where dmJ(pmJ) denotes the demand function of a consumer for good m in country J 
and pmJ is the price of good m in country J.  The demand functions are calculated from 
the incentives described in equation (1). They are defined for non-negative quantities and 
prices and are denominated in domestic currency. The values of the demand parameters 
(amJ,bmJ) in effect in the experiment are given in table 2. 
 
[Table 2: About Here] 
    
The production technologies available to producers were approximations of (3). 
The values of the productivity parameters are given in table 2. Country A had a 
comparative (as well as an absolute) advantage in the production of x, B in y, and C in z. 
fmJ(k,l) denotes the production function of a single producer of output m in country J. The 
supply function of a supplier of factor m in country J is denoted as smJ(wmJ) = cmJ * wmJ – 
emJ, and the parameter values are given in table 2. 
The competitive equilibrium of the economy can be found by solving a system of 
23 equations. The first nine equations are market-clearing conditions in the output market 
of the form described in (4).  DJm(pJm) = Σ dJm(pJm) and SJm(pJm) = ΣsJm(pJm) denote 
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market demand and supply for good m in country J respectively.9 IMPJm is equal to the 
net imports of good m into country J. The equations say that the amount of a commodity 
that is consumed in a country equals the net imports of the commodity into the country 
plus the home production of the commodity.10 That is, for J = A, B, and C, and m = x, y, 
and z: 
 
DJm(pJm) = SJm(pJm) + IMPJm    (4) 
 
Six equations of the form  (5) describe the market-clearing conditions for the two 
inputs in the three countries. They say that the wage of a factor is such that the quantity 
of the factor demanded in a country is equal to the amount that is supplied in that country. 
International trade in the inputs k and l is not permitted. For m = {l,k} and J = {A, B, C}:  
 
       DJm(wJm) = SJm(wJm)      
(5) 
 
Another six equations in the system are Law of One Price conditions, and are of 
the form (6). They require that prices of outputs in different countries be equal, adjusting 
with the appropriate exchange rate. rB  is the exchange rate of currency B for currency A 
(rB units of currency B trade for one unit of currency A). rC is the exchange rate of 
currency C for A. For J = {B, C} and m = {x, y, z}: 
 
pAm = rJ * pJm      (6) 
 
The final three equations reflect the flow of funds theory of exchange rates. They 
require that exchange rates adjust so that the demand for foreign exchange as dictated by 
imports equals the supply of foreign exchange as dictated by exports. Since the third 
equation is a linear combination of the first two, only (7) and (8) are used to compute the 
competitive equilibrium.  
 
pAx * (IMPBx + IMPCx) = pBy * IMPAy / rB +  pB Cz * IMPAz/rC  (7) 
pBy * (IMPAy + IMPCy) = pAx * IMPBx * rB +  pB Cz * IMPBz *rBB
                                                
/rC  (8) 
pCz * (IMPAz + IMPBz) = pAx * IMPCz * rC +  pBy * IMPCy *rC/rB  (9) 
 
 
 Market demands and supplies can be calculated in a straightforward manner from 
the individual demands and the data in tables 1 and 2. Table 3 contains the solution to the 
 
9 The supply of outputs and the demand for inputs are calculated from the production functions in a 
straightforward manner. An individual firm producing output m and residing in country J has a factor 
demand for input k with the form: dkJ(p,w) = (HmJpmJ)2/(16(wkJ)1.5(wlJ).5)), where HmJ = 4 for x in country A, 
y in country B, and z in country C. HmJ = 2 for all other goods in the three countries. The market level 
demand for an input in each country is calculated by summing the demand of the factor over all firms. The 
market supply of a firm selling output M in country J is given by smJ(p,w) =(HmJ)2pmJ/((wkJ).5(wlJ).5. A 
country’s market supply for an output is calculated by summing the supply of individual firms. 
10 Countries A, B, and C have comparative advantages in x, y, and z respectively. In equilibrium they each 
export that good. Country A imports y and z, B imports x and z, and C imports x and y.  
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23 equation system for each experiment. The solution defines a set of testable 
predictions, to which we shall refer as the Competitive Model, which are the competitive 
equilibrium values of the variables. These differ between the experiments because of the 
different numbers of agents of each of the twelve types. From the values in the table, the 
quantities of production and consumption of outputs, as well as the quantity of each input 
employed in the production of each output under the Competitive Model, can be 
calculated. 
 
    [Table 3: About Here]  
 
2f: An Alternative: The Autarky Model 
An alternative model to the competitive equilibrium, which we call the autarky 
model, assumes that there is no international trade and that the currency markets are 
inactive. Within each country, prices and wages clear the domestic markets. The 
predictions of the autarky model are calculated as the solution of nine equations of the 
form (4) and six of the form (5) , with all of the international trade terms IMPmJ 
constrained to equal zero. In other words, the autarky model is the Walrasian equilibrium 
of each country J’s economy under the assumption that it is completely isolated from 
other countries. The predictions of the autarky model for each of the three experiments 
are given in table 3, along with those of the competitive model.  
In these economies, the autarky model is not as unreasonable a predictive model 
as one might think at first glance. International trade includes some risks. An importer 
must first purchase foreign currency, which has no value to him at the end of the trading 
period, in order to make purchases in a foreign country. The currency market purchases 
must be of a sufficient quantity to allow the importer to complete the foreign purchases, 
yet not be of such a large quantity that unspent foreign currency cannot be resold for 
domestic currency before the end of the period. If an insufficient number of agents are 
willing to engage in international trade, the currency markets may become thin, 
eventually discouraging all traders from using them, and as a consequence causing the 
disappearance of international trade.  Conceptually, in the light of complexity, risk 
aversion, and transactions costs, autarky might be the only stable equilibrium so it cannot 
be simply dismissed without examination. 
 
3. Statistical Methodology 
The Equilibration Hypothesis has two components, reduced variability  and 
convergence. Reduced variability is a notion of decreasing variability of the value of a 
market-level variable over time, where a unit of time is defined as a market period. It can 
be defined for any input price, output price, exchange rate, or quantity produced, traded 
and consumed of any good at either the national or international level.  
To evaluate whether or not reduced variability is occurring, we calculate the 
normalized standard deviation of prices, wages, exchange rates, production, and 
international trade flows. We divide the data from each experiment into two segments of 
equal length, and designate the two segments as the early and the late periods of the 
experiment. For experiment 1, the early and late periods comprise periods 1-6 and 7-12, 
respectively. In experiments 2 and 3, the early and late periods correspond to periods 1-8 
and 9-16, respectively. For price variables: output prices, wages and exchange rates, the 
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normalized standard deviation is defined as σimL/μimL, where σimL is the standard deviation 
of all transaction prices in market m during the late periods of experiment i, and μimL is 
the average transaction price in the late periods of experiment i. σimE and μimE are 
analogous variables for the first half (the early periods) of the experiments. For trade 
flows and production, the same variables are calculated, although the total quantity 
imported or produced in each period is the unit of observation, rather than the individual 
transaction.  
We say that reduced variability is occurring in a market if σimL/μimL < σimE/μimE, 
that is, if the normalized standard deviation is lower in the late periods than in the early 
periods. We say that the economy as a whole exhibits reduced variability if (a) the 
percentage of market prices that exhibit reduced variability is significantly greater than 
50%, and (b) the percentage of market quantity variables that exhibit reduced variability 
is significantly greater than 50%. To test for reduced variability we use a sign test of the 
hypothesis that the median value of σimL/μimL - σimE/μimE, over the relevant variables, is 
greater than or equal to zero. If the hypothesis is rejected it means that a significant 
majority of the variables is exhibiting reduced variability and therefore that the economy 
is exhibiting reduced variability. 
Convergence occurs when prices are closer to the competitive equilibrium values 
in late periods than in early periods. We will say that convergence of a variable occurs if 
the inequality |μimL – mi*| < |μimE – mi*| holds, where mi* denotes the competitive 
equilibrium prediction of variable m in experiment i. As with stabilization, we say that an 
economy is converging if a significant majority of both price and quantity variables 
exhibit convergence.  
For any variable that exhibits equilibration we can estimate the exact value to 
which the variable would converge asymptotically if the data in the experiment were 
extrapolated into the infinite future. Even if equilibration is observed and the variables 
move in the direction of their equilibrium values, it is possible that they converge 
asymptotically to values other than those of equilibrium. To estimate these values, we use 
the model in equation (10), first employed in Noussair et al. (1995). The equation is a 
natural specification for panel data where there is heterogeneity between the data series at 
the beginning of the time horizon the data covers, but where the dependent variable 
converges to a common asymptote near the end of the time horizon, a common pattern in 

















−+++=− ββββ    (10) 
 
In the above equation, yit denotes the value of one of the variables in the economy 
in period t of the ith experiment, and yi* is the competitive equilibrium value of the 
variable. yi* has no index for time because the competitive equilibrium predictions 
remain the same over time within an experiment, although they differ between 
experiments. Di is a dummy variable for experiment i and t denotes the time period 
within the experiment. For example, Di equals 1 if the data are from experiment i. The 
model allows for the estimation of the value of the dependent variable at the beginning of 
each horizon and the value to which the series is converging. In the first period of 
experiment i, Di/t = 1 and all of the other variables equal 0. Therefore, β11 is the estimated 
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value of the time series at the beginning of experiment 1, and β12 and β13 are analogous. In 
later periods of experiment i the Di/t term decreases toward 0, while the variable (t-1)/t 
increases toward 1. If t were projected to the infinite future, (t-1)/t would converge to 1. 
Therefore β2 can be interpreted as the asymptote to which the time series is converging. 
We will refer to the β2 estimate as the convergence value of the variable. The 
specification assumes that there is a common value to which the time series is converging 
for all experiments. We will say that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a variable 
converges to its competitive equilibrium value if the estimated β2 is not significantly 
different from zero. The standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity to account for 




4.1. The equilibration hypothesis 
Figures 4 – 6 illustrate the price patterns observed in experiment three, which are typical 
for the three economies we studied. Figure 4 shows the average transaction prices for the 
three outputs during each period in each of the three countries in experiment three in 
comparison with the competitive equilibrium prices, shown in bold horizontal lines. 
Figure 5 contains the analogous data for input prices. Figure 6 illustrates the average 
exchange rate, as well the competitive equilibrium exchange rate, and the level that 
would be consistent with Purchasing Power Parity given the actual average prices in the 
three countries. It is apparent from the figures that the values of many of the variables 
differ substantially from the competitive equilibrium levels. For example, the price of z in 
country B is roughly 50% higher than the competitive equilibrium level for most of the 
experiment. The prices of y and z in country C are higher than the equilibrium by similar 
percentages. The exchange rate of currency C to A is roughly 40% higher than the 
predicted rate of 5.17.  However, the time series also suggest that many of the variables 
are closer to the equilibrium levels in the late periods than in the early periods, suggesting 
that equilibration, as defined in section 1, may be taking place. For example, in country 
C, the prices of k, x, y, and z are noticeably closer to their equilibrium levels in the late 
periods of the experimental session than early on. The same is true for k and x in country 
B. Result 1 and its supporting discussion summarize the balance of the evidence on 
equilibration in our data.  
 
   [Figures 4-6: About Here] 
 
Result 1: The equilibration hypothesis is supported.  
 
Support for result 1: Table 3 contains the competitive model predictions for each of 23 
system level variables in the experiment. In addition, the competitive equilibrium implies 
a level of production of each good in each country, yielding predictions for 9 more 
variables. Since there are three independent experiments, these data make up 96 time 
series. The equilibration hypothesis asserts that (a) the variance in the variables of the 
economy declines over time (reduced variability) and (b) the variables attain values 
closer to the equilibrium over time (convergence). Operationally, as described in section 
three, we define an economy to be equilibrating if significantly more than 50% of the 
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price and quantity variables exhibit declining variance and means closer to the 
competitive equilibrium in the late periods than in the early periods. 
We find that reduced variability is occurring in the experimental economies. 
σimL/μimL < σimE/μimE for 23 of 27 output prices (3 outputs*3 countries*3 experiments), 15 
of 18 wage rates, 5 of 6 exchange rates, 17 of 18 trade variables (IMPmJ quantities) and 
24 of 27 production variables. In other words, 43 of 51 prices and 41 of 45 quantities are 
exhibiting reduced variability. We reject at p < .01 the hypothesis that 50% or less of the 
price variables are exhibiting reduced variability as well as the hypothesis that 50% or 
less of the quantity variables are exhibiting reduced variability at the same level of 
significance.  
Convergence is also occurring. Prices, wages, exchange rates, production, and 
magnitudes of international trade are closer to the equilibrium predictions late in the 
sessions than early in the sessions. The inequality |μimL – pim*| < |μimE – pim*|, where pim* 
denotes the competitive equilibrium price, holds for 20 of 27 output prices, 13 of 18 input 
prices, and 5 of 6 exchange rates. The inequality |μimL – qim*| < |μimE – qim*| , where qim* 
denotes the competitive equilibrium quantity, is satisfied for 17 of 18 international trade 
flow variables, and 17 of 27 production variables. Thus, for 41 of 51 prices and 34 of 45 
quantities, convergence is occurring. We reject the hypotheses that 50% or fewer of the 
prices (at p < .01) and that 50% or fewer of the quantities (at p < .05) are converging. 
Therefore, convergence is also taking place in the economies.  
 
Thus, although the pattern is less obvious than in previous experimental studies of 
simpler economies, there exists evidence that the economic variables are closer in the late 
periods than in the early periods to a common attractor, their equilibrium values. They 
also exhibit less variation in the late than in the early periods. A natural question arises 
about what patterns might be observed if the experiment were conducted over a much 
longer horizon. In particular, would the variables in the economy converge to and not 
merely toward their equilibrium values? We consider this issue with estimation of 
equation (10), which can provide estimates of the precise values toward which the data 
series are converging if extrapolated into the infinite future. The particular equation 
seems to be a reasonable specification to capture the structure of the data in light of the 
presence of reduced variability and convergence. The estimated coefficients for output 
prices are shown in table 4. The estimates of the same model for input prices and 
exchange rates are given in table 5. Those for imports of goods into each of the three 
countries and the production of each country are in table 6.  
 
[Tables 3 – 5: About Here] 
 
 The tables show that many of the convergence values, described by the β2 
coefficients, are significantly different from zero, indicating that even if we extrapolate 
our data to the distant future, we cannot conclude that they converge asymptotically to 
values precisely equal to the competitive equilibrium. Thus, assuming the convergence 
process follows the structure of (10), there appears to be some degree of deviation from 
the competitive equilibrium, even in the long run. This is consistent with the visual 
impression gained from observation of figures 4 – 6. Nevertheless, the regressions 
support the notion that an equilibration process, albeit incomplete, is taking place in the 
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economy. The β2 coefficients are closer to zero than the β1j coefficients for 16 of 27 
output prices (where each comparison is between a β2 and one of the β1j coefficient from 
the same estimated equation), 12 of 18 wages, and 6 of 6 exchange rates. The 
convergence is more evident for quantities transacted. For 15 of the 18 import variables 
and 21 of the 27 production variables, β2 is closer to zero than the corresponding β11, …, 
β13 terms. The result that convergence in the direction of equilibrium is stronger for 
quantities than for prices is consistent with results obtained in the simpler international 
economies studied by Noussair et al. (1995, 1997). The production variables have β2 
coefficients greater than the corresponding β1j terms in 26 of 27 instances indicating that 
output is increasing over time.11   
 
4.2. Properties of the equilibration process 
In this subsection we conduct an exploratory analysis of the production, trade and price 
data, and study the empirical characteristics of the equilibration process in our 
economies. We investigate whether the equilibration process is characterized by 
consistent and regular dynamics. The regressions in tables 4 - 6 reveal several interesting 
patterns about the nature of the equilibration process. The first pattern is that the 
estimated β2 coefficients tend to deviate from the equilibrium in the direction of autarky. 
Under autarky, the prices of the goods that would be exported under free trade, xA, yB and 
zC, are lower than in the competitive equilibrium, and the quantity of these goods 
produced is below the competitive equilibrium level. The output prices and quantities 
produced for the remaining six outputs are higher in autarky than in the competitive 
equilibrium. The import variables are all equal to zero in autarky and positive in the 
competitive equilibrium. The convergence values tend to lie between the competitive 
equilibrium and the autarky levels. This pattern is similar to the home bias often noted in 
the study of field data, since it reveals the presence of lower international trade than the 
fundamentals of the economies would predict even when taking into account 
transportation costs, tariffs, and other measurable variables, as well as the price patterns 
characteristic of a home bias. We will refer to the tendency of the economies to deviate 
from their equilibria in the direction of autarky as the home bias property. 
 
Property 1: The Home Bias Property – A home bias in trade exists. Observed trade 
and production levels deviate from competitive model predictions in direction of 
autarky. 
  
Support for property 1: All of the β2 coefficients in table 5 for the variables indicating 
import quantities and the location of the production of the three goods differ from zero in 
the direction of autarky. The levels of imports are all lower than in the competitive 
equilibrium, as are the levels of production of the goods that a country exports (the 
variables ProdxA, ProdyB, ProdzC). All of the other production levels are greater than in 
                                                 
11 We can measure the amount of the increase in output that is due to increasing factor utilization by 
producers and the amount that is due to productivity increases (increasing output per unit of input), by 
calculating a version of the Solow (1957) residual, which is the component of increased output that greater 
utilization of factors cannot explain. Factor utilization in the economy increases by an average of 14.14% 
per period from periods 1 to 3 and .58% per period thereafter. Productivity increases by an average of 
7.87% per period from periods 1 to 3 and .65 % per period thereafter. 
 13
the competitive equilibrium, indicating that more production of these goods for domestic 
consumption occurs than predicted. Six of eight β2 coefficients for output prices deviate 
from the competitive model in the direction of autarky (pyB is not significantly different 
from the competitive level at the 5% level of significance).   
 
 This “Home Bias Puzzle” has given rise to many alternative theories to explain 
why there is less international trade than theory predicts.12 Among those explanations are 
imperfect contract enforcement (Anderson and Marcouiller, 1999,) differences in legal 
systems (Turrini and Van Ypersele, 2001,) intermediate goods trade (Hillberry and 
Hummels, 2002,) and information/networks (Rauch, 2001.) While these explanations 
may be plausible for accounting for the field data, none of these are factors in our 
laboratory experiments. In the experiments, convergence toward the general equilibrium 
takes place from the direction of autarky, which corresponds to 100% home bias.  Thus, a 
slow or incomplete adjustment to equilibrium would retain a lingering property of home 
bias. Furthermore, if a change in the underlying environment moved the equilibrium 
toward increased international trade, a less than instantaneous equilibration process 
would also have the home bias property. 
 One might be tempted to think that the cash-in-advance constraint accounts for 
the home bias in our economies. However, any experimental design will have some 
agents engaging in international trade having to make a sequence of decisions. That is, 
decisions about how much of a good to buy and sell and at what price must be made at a 
different point in time than the decision about how much foreign exchange to buy or sell 
and at what exchange rate. This creates inherent risk in foreign transactions that does not 
exist for domestic transactions. We believe that it is this risk that creates “home bias” and 
will be part of the environment no matter how the mechanics of the foreign exchange are 
structured. We also suspect that this type of risk is present not only in our experimental 
environment, but also in field economies.  
Property 1 concerns the quantities of goods traded in our economies. Properties 2 
and 3 below describe the behavior of transaction prices. We have already noted that 
prices tend to deviate from the Competitive Model predictions in the direction of autarky. 
However, in addition to the mean prices following a particular pattern relative to the 
equilibrium level, we also find that the variances in input and output prices exhibit 
consistent patterns. These are summarized as property 2. The normalized standard 
deviations of transaction prices are generally greater for input than for output prices. This 
                                                 
12 Home bias in field data has been carefully documented in McCallum (1995) for example. McCallum’s 
work points to a very large border effect so that the spatial location of trade matters a great deal. He finds 
that trade between two Canadian provinces is more than twenty times larger than trade between one of the 
provinces and a US state of similar size and distance. However, in our experimental world there is no 
spatial element and no borders. So, the home bias we find in our data cannot be due to border effects. 
Anderson (2000) surveys recent empirical work on the existence of home bias in international trade in 
commodities and concludes that, “The evidence points to very large missing transactions costs of 
international trade.” He then suggests possible sources of transaction costs that include information costs, 
imperfect contract enforcement, insecurity, and non-diversifiable risks. In our laboratory environment, the 
information is the same for domestic and foreign purchases, contract enforcement and security are not 
issues and the type of risk considered by Anderson does not arise in our environment. So, our finding of 
home bias suggests that the missing transactions costs may be due, at least in part, to the out-of-equilibrium 
dynamics of market convergence, in addition to those causes postulated in the literature. 
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is consistent with empirical studies of field data (see for example, Clark 1999) that find 
that prices for primary and intermediate goods, as measured by the Producer Price Index, 
tend to be more volatile than for final goods, measured by the Consumer Price Index. 
Furthermore, normalized standard deviations also tend to be greater for exchange rates 
than for either input or output prices. The volatility of exchange rates has been a topic of 
interest in international finance. It has been noted that changes in exchange rates are not 
fully reflected in prices of goods in different countries, leading to failures of the Law of 
One Price and of Purchasing Power Parity (see for example Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2000). 
In our data we also find that exchange rates tend to be more volatile than other prices. 
 
Property 2: The Input/Output/Exchange Price Variance Property – Transaction 
price variability is higher for producer (input) prices than for consumer (output) 
prices. Exchange rates exhibit more variability than the prices in other markets. 
Support for property 2. To provide a measure of the volatility of consumer prices, we 
calculate the pooled average normalized standard deviation across the two input markets 



























, where nmJ is 
the number of units of input m traded in country J. We calculate as well the pooled 
average normalized standard deviation over the three output markets in each country, 




































We consider the late periods of each experiment. In experiment 1, the pooled normalized 
standard deviation of prices in the input markets is greater than that of output markets in 
each of the three countries. In experiments 2 and 3, the input markets exhibit greater 
pooled normalized standard deviations than the output markets in 2 of the 3 countries. 
Thus, in seven of nine possible cases, there is more variability in national producer prices 
than in consumer prices. 
We also calculate the pooled average normalized standard deviation of prices in 
the late periods in the currency markets and compare them to those of prices in the six 
world input markets (two markets in each country) and the nine world output markets. In 
each of the three experiments, the normalized standard deviation of prices is greater in 
the currency markets than in the input markets as well as in the output markets.     
 
Thus, it appears that input and output markets behave differently in some respects 
from each other and from foreign exchange markets. The greater price variance in input 
than in output markets may reflect a relatively slow speed of adjustment of markets, such 
as factor markets, where demand is derived rather than exogenous as in the output 
markets. Such a principle is consistent with the high variance observed in exchange rates, 
since demand for foreign exchange is also derived. The markets tend to stabilize 
“backwards”, beginning with the final goods market, and followed by input markets. 
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Thus, a version of the “Swingback Hypothesis” (Forsythe et al. 1982), observed in 
experimental asset markets, appears to be at work in our economies.13  
Markets for foreign exchange are of special interest to economists. It has been 
noted in field studies that exchange rates exhibit persistent departures from purchasing 
power parity levels. As the support of property 3 documents, there are deviations from 
purchasing power parity in our data as well, but they tend to diminish over time. Figure 6 
illustrates this pattern, and shows that during the convergence process exchange rates 
track ever more closely over time the level that corresponds to Purchasing Power Parity, 
the exchange rate that would equalize purchasing power in the two countries. We define 


































r    (11) 
 
The weighted output price averages for each country in the numerator and the 
denominator of (11) use the actual world production (which is always equal to world 
consumption) of each good as the weight for the good in the consumption bundle (j 
indexes the country). In our data, we find that the exchange rates tend to converge toward 
the PPP level, even when the PPP level departs from the competitive equilibrium. 
Although the output markets might be in disequilibrium, the currency market prices 
adjust in the direction of equalizing purchasing power in the two countries. While the 
movement of exchange rates is toward PPP, this convergence is not complete even 
asymptotically. As table 6 reveals, the exchange rate of currency C for A does not reach 
the PPP level. Of course, since prices in the goods markets are not at equilibrium levels in 
all markets, the Law of One Price  will fail to hold for some goods. 
 
Property 3: Purchasing Power Parity Convergence - Exchange rates tend to move in 
the direction of purchasing power parity levels. However, convergence is incomplete 
and purchasing power parity is not reached.  
 
Support for property 3: Table 6 contains the regression results for the variable (rA - 
rAPPP) and (rB – rB BPPP). For both variables, the β2 terms are closer to zero that any of the 
other three coefficients. For the variable rBB
                                                
 – rBPPP, the β2 term is not significantly 
different from zero. However, the β2 term for rA - rAPPP is significantly different from zero 
at the p < .05 level.   
 
   [Table 6: About Here] 
 
Property 4 encompasses two characteristics of prices of final goods. The first is 
that final goods prices tend to be greater than the competitive model predictions. This is 
consistent with previous experimental work on multiple-market economies (Goodfellow 
 
13 In repeated markets for two-period assets, the final period transaction price tends to converge to near its 
rational expectations equilibrium price before the first period transaction price does.  
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and Plott, 1990; Noussair et al., 1995). The second is that the greater consumer surplus is, 
relative to the competitive equilibrium revenue in the market, the farther the average 
transaction price is above the competitive prediction. Since all market demand curves for 
final goods in our economies are linear, the statement is equivalent to the assertion that 
the steeper the demand function, holding the competitive equilibrium price and quantity 
constant, the more the price exceeds the competitive prediction. This pattern is somewhat 
reminiscent of the rent asymmetry effect studied by Smith and Williams (1982). They 
note that prices in single market economies tend to converge to equilibrium prices from 
above when equilibrium consumer surplus exceeds producer surplus, and from below 
when producer surplus is greater than consumer surplus. In essence, prices in our markets 
are higher relative to equilibrium prices when they have upward flexibility, that is, when 
high prices have relatively small consequences on the quantity exchanged.   
 
Property 4: The Surplus Price Adjustment Property for Final Goods - Output prices 
are higher than in the competitive equilibrium. The difference between observed 
and equilibrium output prices tends to be greater, the greater the ratio of consumer 
surplus to equilibrium expenditure. 
 
Support for property 4: Table 3 shows that for eight of the nine outputs in the economy, 
the convergence value is positive and for seven of nine it is significantly positive, 
indicating that output prices tend to converge to levels greater than competitive 
equilibrium values. We compare the correlation between the following two variables for 
each good in each country (nine total goods). The first variable 
is , the ratio of competitive equilibrium consumer 





















J/pmJ*, the ratio of the observed to the equilibrium price of good m in country J. 
denotes the quantity of m sold in country J and is the corresponding equilibrium 
quantity.  is the observed price of m sold in J and denotes the equilibrium price. 









2 in table 3 to the 









. We rank the nine goods (three goods in 
three countries) by their values of the two variables, which are pooled across sessions, 
and calculate the correlation between the two rankings. The correlation between the two 
rankings is .636. Furthermore, the goods pxC, pxB, and pyC have the first, second, and third 
highest values of both variables, and pxA has the lowest value of both variables. The ratio 
of consumer surplus to competitive equilibrium expenditure and the observed percentage 
that the price exceeds the equilibrium level are highly positively correlated.   
  
Property 5 is a relationship between output and input prices that was previously 
observed in other experimental studies (Noussair et al., 1995; Hey and di Cagno, 2000; 
Riedl and van Winden, 2001). The relationship also appears here. Noussair et al. 
observed that the ratio of input to output prices was below the competitive equilibrium 
ratio in their data. They explained the deviation from the competitive equilibrium ratios 
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as a compensation for a risk that producers undertook, and they referred to the price 
pattern as the Risk Compensated Input/Output Price Adjustment Property. The source of 
the risk lies in the fact that producers must commit themselves to purchase inputs that 
have no value other than in the irreversible production of an output to be sold later at a 
price that is unknown at the time of the input purchase. To compensate for the risk they 
bear, producers earn a premium over the amount they would earn in the competitive 
equilibrium. We find that the property generalizes in a straightforward way to the 
economies studied here, although not quite as consistently. This risk premium, along with 
the inefficiencies in production arising from the misallocation of input between firms and 
suboptimal input mixes within firms, appears to account for the fact that output prices 
exceed the competitive predictions. 
 
Property 5: The Risk Compensated Input/Output Price Adjustment Property - 
Wage/Price ratios are lower than the competitive equilibrium level.  
 
Support for property 5: The existence of three outputs and two inputs in each of three 
countries define six ratios of wages to prices within a country and a total of 18 in the 
economy. Over the three experiments there are 54 ratios of the form wmJ/pnJ . Over the 
course of an experiment, 33 of 54 ratios (61.1%) have an average value lower than the 
competitive equilibrium level, and in the late periods (the second half of the life of the 
economies), 37 of 54 (68.5%) have an average value lower than the equilibrium ratio.   
 
The final property of the equilibration process presented here is a behavioral 
regularity that has been observed in some previous experimental studies, the Sawtooth 
property of transaction prices (see Plott 2002 for a detailed discussion). The Sawtooth 
property is a characteristic of the time series of transaction prices in a goods market 
within a period. Here the pattern appears to manifest itself with much greater force than 
in simpler experimental economies. In almost all markets for both outputs and inputs, and 
in all of the experiments, prices are declining within a market period.  
 
Property 6: The Sawtooth Property - Within a market period, input and output 
markets exhibit the "sawtooth" property. Transaction prices decline within the 
period. This pattern is consistent with the existence of a higher option value for 
goods acquired earlier in the period. 
 
An example is shown in figure 7. We believe that declining prices within periods 
in these markets (resale of units purchased is permitted in any of the markets) occurs at 
least in part because the option of resale later in the period increases the value of units 
obtained early in the period. The observation that the Sawtooth Property does not appear 
in our foreign exchange markets supports this interpretation. Unlike in an input or an 
output market, the option value of resale of foreign currency exists for both parties to the 
transaction. Each party to a foreign exchange transaction is a “purchaser” of a “good”, a 
foreign currency (domestic currency can be thought of as the money used to purchase the 
good), which has more value when acquired earlier in the market period. The premia 
resulting from the option value of resale for the two parties may thus have a tendency to 
offset, and the result is the absence of the Sawtooth pattern in the currency markets. 
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    [Figure 7: About Here] 
 
5. Conclusions 
Experimental economics has produced a growing body of evidence supporting a 
principle of market convergence toward the equilibrium of the competitive model. The 
competitive equilibrium is defined as a solution to a system of simultaneous equations 
and is thus a static concept. However, the equilibration process is dynamic and is 
influenced by human behavior resulting from bounded rationality, heterogeneous beliefs, 
learning and errors. These uncontrolled features of behavior interact with technological 
and institutional constraints such as irreversible production, cash-in-advance constraints, 
undiversifiable risk, and the particular institutions of exchange in effect, to produce a 
dynamic process of activity over time. Our understanding of this convergence process is 
empirical so a natural question exists about the robustness of the stylized facts of market 
convergence. 
The research reported here created an economic system far larger and more 
complex than anything studied experimentally in the past and focused on three issues. 
The first is the robustness of the most basic principles of market behavior to matters of 
scale. We consider whether behaviors observed in small-scale laboratory economies are 
also observed at a larger, more complex scale. Are larger scale economies orderly and 
similar to smaller scale versions or does chaos ensue with scale?  Do new and different 
principles emerge to govern system behavior or do the same principles observed 
operating in smaller economies still apply? 
  Our data demonstrate that chaos does not necessarily ensue as the complexity of 
the economy increases. An equilibration process is clearly evident in the sense that the 
movements of economic variables are in the direction of the general competitive 
equilibrium of the appropriate model together with decreasing variance.  Although the 
equilibration process is slower and less complete than in simpler economies, there are no 
qualitative differences.  The same principles are in operation at both scales. 
 The second issue is the reliability of the competitive model as developed to deal 
with the particular production, preference, and market interdependencies that are 
characteristic of international economies. We conclude that the essential elements of the 
special version of competitive theory that has evolved to address complex issues of 
international trade and finance are operating. The general equilibrium model in the form 
of a classical theory of international economics predicts much of what is observed.  In the 
sense of the movement of magnitudes of variables such as trade flows and exchange 
rates, the general theory of international trade and finance emerges with much supporting 
evidence.   
Our experiments contribute to a third issue. We ask whether empirical patterns 
frequently observed in field settings appear in the experiments. If such patterns are 
observed, it demonstrates that explanations of field events are not forced by logic to 
special institutions, parameters, or theories, for explanations of what they have observed. 
The theoretical principles of the general equilibrium model coupled with the properties of 
the market equilibration process may provide appropriate explanations in some cases. 
Indeed, some well-known empirical patterns typically found in data from field studies of 
international trade and finance are also found in the experimental data.  Exchange rates 
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and prices converge toward purchasing power parity levels, though not completely. 
Exchange rates exhibit proportionally more variance than input or output prices. The 
variance of input prices exceeds that of output prices. A home bias in trade is observed. 
That is, accounting for transportation costs, tariffs and other measurable variables, there 
is significantly less international trade than theory predicts.  
At least in our economies, the above properties appear to be properties of the 
equilibration process as opposed to consequences of special institutions, policy variables 
or technological change. Of course, our findings do not imply that patterns observed in 
field data are not affected by shocks or policy, but they do raise the possibility that the 
patterns observed in the field are characteristics of the process of market equilibration of 
international economies. In principle, the methodology we have used here, the 
exploration of the laboratory data for patterns that appear in field data, may be 
successfully applied in reverse. In particular, the empirical patterns observed in 
experiments might be used to motivate conjectures about patterns of field data produced 
in naturally occurring economies.  
We close with the conjecture that the patterns of convergence we observe in our 
experiments will be observed operating at much larger scales than we were able to create 
for this study. We saw nothing about the operation of these economies that would suggest 
that the basic principles of economic behavior would be severely modified by scale. The 
results reported here suggest that much larger market systems are beyond neither the 
human capacities of participants in the economies nor beyond the reach of laboratory 
experimental methods.   
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 Table 1: Number of Participants of Each of the Twelve Types and Their Functions  






1 A Producer of X 
Consumer of Y 
fxA(k,l) = 4l.25k.25 
U(y) = 1650y  - 100y2  
5 3 5 
2 A Producer of Y 
Consumer of X and Z 
fyA(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(x,z) = 700x – 100x2 + 1900z – 
100z2
5 3 5 
3 A Producer of Z 
Consumer of X and Y 
fzA(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(x,y) = 700x – 100x2 + 1650y  - 
100y2
5 3 4 
4 A Supplier of L and K 
Consumer of Z 
C(l,k) = 26l + 2l2 + 10k + 5k2
U(z) =1900z – 100z2
5 3 5 
5 B Producer of X 
Consumer of Y and Z 
fxB(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(y,z) = 3900y – 400y2 + 5600z 
– 400z2
5 4 5 
6 B Producer of Y 
Consumer of X 
fyB(k,l) = 4l.25k.25 
U(x) = 3800x – 400x2
5 4 5 
7 B Producer of Z 
Consumer of X and Y 
fZB(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(x,y) = 3800x – 400x2 + 3900y 
– 400y2
5 4 4 
8 B Supplier of L and K 
 
Consumer of Z 
C(l,k) = 48l + 15l2 + 4.091k + 
7.5k2
U(z) = 5600z – 400z2
5 4 5 
9 C Producer of X 
Consumer of Y and Z 
fxC(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(y,z) = 13500y – 1000y2 + 
16000z – 1000z2
5 4 5 
10 C Producer of Y 
Consumer of X and Z 
fyC(k,l) = 2l.25k.25 
U(x,z) = 12000x – 1000x2 + 
16000z – 1000z2
5 3 5 
11 C Producer of Z fzC(k,l) = 4l.25k.25 5 2 4 
12 C Supplier of L and K 
 
Consumer of X and Y 
C(l,k)= 300l + 50l2 + 220k + 
20k2
U(x,y) = 12000x – 1000x2 + 
13500z – 1000z2
5 3 5 
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Table 2: Values of Parameters in Individual Demand, Production, and Supply Functions 
 
Demand (amJ, bmJ)  
 Country A  Country B Country C 
Good x 3.5, 0.005 4.75, 0.00125 6, 0.0005 
Good y 8.25, 0.005 4.875, 0.00125 6.25, 0.0005 
Good z 9.5, 0.005 7, 0.00125 8, 0.0005 
 
Supply (cmJ, emJ) 
 Country A Country B Country C 
Factor l 0.25, 6.5 1/30, 1.6 0.01, 3 
Factor k 0.1, 1 1/15, 11/3 1/40, 5.5 
Production (HmJ) 
 Country A  Country B Country C 
Good x 4 2 2 
Good y 2 4 2 




Table 3: Competitive Equilibrium and Autarky Prices, Wages, Trade Volumes, and 
Exchange Rates in the Experiments 
 
Variable Competitive Model Autarky Model 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 
pxA 539 567 497 205 206 184 
pyA 795 724 773 1036 1036 981 
pzA 1035 1008 1142 1193 1193 1275 
pxB 1095 1249 1006 2034 2016 2111 
pyB 1614 1594 1564 855 850 851 
pzB 2101 2219 2312 2994 2984 3847 
pxC 3329 4000 2567 7269 6587 7325 
pyC 4906 5106 3993 7569 8181 7629 
pzC 6385 7108 5902 4405 6187 5477 
wAl 143 142 139 139 139 134 
wAk 209 208 203 203 203 179 
wBl 537 544 514 531 527 557 
wBk 391 396 375 387 384 406 
wCl 1942 2110 1811 1898 2024 1948 
wCk 1235 1351 1162 1217 1295 1248 
IMPBx 22 15 16 0 0 0 
IMPCx 33 21 34 0 0 0 
IMPAy 20 15 16 0 0 0 
IMPCy 22 17 32 0 0 0 
IMPAz 13 9 11 0 0 0 
IMPBz 23 15 25 0 0 0 
rB 2.03 2.2 2.02 - - - 
rC 6.17 7.06 5.17 - - - 
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Table 4: Estimates of Convergence Regression for Output Prices 



















































































*: significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 5: Estimates of Convergence Regression for Input Prices and Exchange Rates 
 












































































*: significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 6: Estimates of Convergence Regression for Imports and Production by Country 












































































































































*: significantly different from zero at the p < .05 level. 
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Table 7: Estimates of Convergence Regression for Differences Between Observed and PPP 
Exchange Rates 
Variable β11 β12 β13 β2 R2

























Figure 1: The Structure of the Economies 
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Inputs 
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MAB ma (0) mb (0) -@- -@- - -/-
MAC ma (0) mc (0) -@- -@- - -/-
XA x (0) ma (0) -@- -@- - -/-
YA y (0) ma (0) -@- -@- - -/-
ZA z (0) ma (0) -@- -@- - -/-
VA v (0) ma (0) -@- -@- - -/-
WA w (0) ma (0) -@- -@- - -/-
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 Figure 3: Production Function Display 
 




8 0 7 8 9 10 10 11 11 12 
7 0 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 11 
6 0 6 7 8 9 9 10 10 11 
5 0 6 7 8 8 9 9 10 10 
4 0 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 10 
3 0 5 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 
2 0 5 6 6 7 7 7 8 8 
1 0 4 5 5 6 6 6 7 7 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
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 Appendix 
The following pages contain the specific instructions used for this experiment. Additional 
instructions on the use of the Marketscape trading system itself are available from the authors. 
 
DETAILED INSTRUCTIONS  
Overview  
The experiment will be divided into periods. All markets will be open for an announced 
time after which all markets will close. Each period starts fresh with new opportunities. 
Inventories, cash, commitments, etc. do not carry over from period to period (unless you 
are told otherwise). Each period is new and possibly unrelated to periods of the past. This 
will be explained in more detail later.  
In the market there are three different goods called X, Y, and Z and there are two 
resources called V and W. There are three different locations, which you can think of as 
different countries. The countries are called A, B, and C. Each participant has a home at 
one of these countries. In each of the three countries there are markets for all goods and 
all resources, five markets in total for V, W, X, Y, and Z. There is a currency in each 
country. All purchases and sales in country A must take place in terms of currency A. 
Likewise, all purchases and sales in countries B and C, must take place in terms of 
currencies B and C, respectively.  
There are three different roles for participants: "consumers", "producers" and "suppliers".  
Participants can have multiple roles. Each participant also has a home country, either A, 
B, or C. You can convert the currency of your home country to U.S. dollars, which are 
yours to keep, at the end of the experiment, at a rate shown on your home pages. Foreign 
currency has value to you only in that it allows you to make purchases in other countries.  
   
THREE TYPES OF ROLES  
CONSUMERS have access to one or more private markets in which the experimenter has 
placed orders. These markets are called PrivateX, PrivateY and PrivateZ. Consumers can 
make money by purchasing X, Y, and Z in public markets and then reselling in their 
private markets. They can buy X, Y and Z in any of the three countries, e.g. the market 
for X in country B is called XB. After buying X, Y, and Z, they can consume it by selling 
it to the experimenter in their private markets. If the expenditures for X, Y, and Z in any 
given period of the experiment are less than the income from the sale in private markets, 
the consumer has made a profit which is his or hers to keep. This "profit" is measured in 
terms of home currency, which can be converted to U.S. dollars are the rate shown on the 
home page.  
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Briefly, X, Y and Z and money have value to consumers. V and W have no value to 
consumers.  
X, Y, and Z have value only if they are consumed. X has the same value to a consumer 
no matter in which country it was produced. The same is true for Y and Z.  
PRODUCERS have the ability to use V and W to make one type of output. It will be 
either X, Y, or Z. They can use home currency to buy V and W from suppliers in their 
home country. The V and W can be used by the producer to produce output, which can 
then be sold for money to anyone who wishes to buy it. Producers can study the 
possibilities for production by using the Production Page link found at the bottom of the 
market page. The form found there takes V and W as inputs and transforms them into X, 
Y, or Z, depending upon the particular producer.  
The schedule that dictates the terms of the transformation can be found by clicking on the 
Production Table link, on the Production page. The Production Table indicates the 
amount of output that results from using various levels of V and W.  
The relationship between inputs and outputs depends on past production until refreshed at 
the start of a new period. The lighted square indicates the relevant past production. If the 
lighted square is at (0,0) then the point (0,0) is used to measure the sensitivity of output 
levels to use of V and W inputs. If you find the lighted square somewhere other than (0,0) 
in the table it means that you have used inputs up to that point and the sensitivity of 
production to further V and W inputs will be measured from the lighted square on. At the 
end of the period, production will be refreshed and you will start from the (0,0) point 
again.  
Briefly, V, W, X, Y, and Z have no value to producers. However, producers can use V 
and W to produce X, Y, or Z. They can sell output to consumers who would like to 
consume them. The money received from selling X, Y, or Z, has value as it is converted 
to dollars at the end of the experiment.  
If the total proceeds from the sale of output in any given period of the experiment is 
greater than the total cost of purchasing V and W in the period, the producer has made a 
profit which is his or hers to keep. That is, if the price of output times the units produced 
from the application of V and W is higher than the cost of the units of V and W used to 
produce it, then the producer has made a profit on that effort.  
   
SUPPLIERS have a private market in which they can purchase V and W. They can sell 
this V and W to anybody in their own country who wishes to purchase it. V and W have 
no value as consumption to suppliers. However, the money received from the sale of V 
and W does have value as it is converted to dollars at the end of the experiment.  
Thus, if the proceeds from the sale of V and W in any given period of the experiment is 
greater than the cost of purchasing V and W in the private markets in the period, the 
supplier has made a profit which is his or hers to keep. If a supplier sells a unit of V or W 
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for a higher price than he/she purchased it for in the private market, the supplier has made 
a profit on that unit.  
   
TRADING PROFITS AND IMPORTING  
TRADING: A potential source of profits is from buying and reselling the five types of 
goods. Buying reduces your cash by the amount of the purchase. Selling increases your 
cash by the amount of the sale. Thus you can either gain or lose money on the purchase 
and resale of units.  
It is also possible to make profits from buying and reselling foreign currency. If you buy 
foreign currency and it increases in value relative to your home currency, and you 
convert it back to you home currency, you can make money. However, if you buy foreign 
currency and it declines in value you can lose money.  
IMPORTING: You have many markets available. Shopping and trading among them 
might be a source of profits. You have the capacity to buy anything (except V and W) in 
a foreign country and sell it at home. That is, you can import anything (except V and W) 
from anywhere and sell it at home. You cannot sell anything (except currency) in a 
foreign market. Thus if prices in a foreign country are low enough you can use home 
currency to buy the foreign currency in either the home market or the foreign currency 
market. You can use the foreign currency to buy foreign goods which you can then sell in 
the home market or in a private market. Briefly put, after buying foreign currency you 
can imagine yourself in a foreign country with an inventory of that country's currency. 
Should you find it advantageous, you could buy X, Y, or Z there instead of buying it in 
your own country.  
   
TIMING OF THE EXPERIMENT  
There will be a sequence of market periods. The values in your private markets last for a 
period and then will disappear.  Similarly, all units will disappear at the end of a period 
and home currency will be transformed to U.S. currency.  When a new period opens, you 
will have new orders in your private markets and a new loan of your home currency.  
<INSERT SCHEDULE OF EXPERIMENT HERE>  
ENDING  
At the end of each period your holdings of home currency will be converted to dollars at 
the rate shown on your home market page. All inventories of foreign currencies and units 
will be gone (automatically removed from the system).  So, near the end of a period you 
need to consider clearing (selling) all inventories because what you are holding other than 
home currency will be worthless.  
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HOW YOU MAKE MONEY  
EXAMPLE 1: Suppose you are a supplier in country A. The experimenter has placed a 
sell order in your private W market for one unit of W for 50 units of currency A. You buy 
the unit for 50 units of currency A, your home currency. Your inventory of currency A 
decreases by 50 and you have the unit of W. Suppose you are able to sell the unit of W 
for 90 units of currency A. From this sequence of transactions you have made 40 units of 
currency A, which are your to keep. If the conversion rate of currency A to US dollars is 
200 currency A per dollar, you have made 20 cents on the sequence of transactions.  
   
EXAMPLE 2: Suppose you are a producer of Y in country B. You see the prices of V 
and W in your country at 300 per unit of V and 500 per unit of W. You see the price of Y 
in your country equals 1000. You have 2000 units of currency B cash on hand. Suppose 
that using your production table, you are able use a unit of V and a unit of W to produce a 
unit of Y. You buy a unit of V at 300 and a unit of W at 500 for a total outlay of 800. 
Then you use the V and W to produce X, which you are able to sell for 1000. You have 
made a profit of 200 currency B. That is, you have the 2000 units of currency B you 
started out with plus 200 more profit. You are now in a position to invest again in V and 
W to make more profit. If the conversion rate of currency B to US dollars is 100 currency 
B to 1 dollar, you have made 2 dollars on the sequence of transactions just described.  
EXAMPLE 3: Suppose you are a consumer in country C. The experimenter has placed a 
buy order in your private Z market for one unit of Z at a price of 500 in terms of currency 
C. Suppose you go to the home Z market and you buy the unit of Z for 350 units of 
currency C. Then, you sell the unit to the experimenter for stated price of 500 in the 
private Z market. From this sequence of transactions you have made 150 units of 
currency C, which are yours to keep. If the conversion rate of currency C to US dollars is 
50 currency C per dollar, you have made 3 dollars on the sequence of transactions.  
   
MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: Inventories of X, Y, and Z might be held as inventory only 
if some particular advantage can be determined. Remember that the opportunities 
afforded by private markets disappear when the private market orders expire at the end of 
the period. At that time the inventories are worth nothing. Thus, in most cases it is to your 
advantage to take advantage of the private market order while the order exists and acquire 
new units to take advantage of new orders in the private markets.  
   





Specialized Terms  
   
ma Currency for country A (m stands for money) 
mb Currency for country B 
mc Currency for country C 
  
XA Public market for good X in country A 
XB Public market for good X in country B 
YA  Public market for good Y in country A 
  
PrivateY235 Id 235's private Y market.  Note, only I.D. 235 sees this, and all your 
private markets will be in your home country. 
  
MAB The currency market in country A where people buy or sell units of 
currency A (ma) with prices quoted in terms of currency B (mb).  So, if 
the price is 2 and you put in a sell order to sell 1 unit of currency A (ma) 
at a price of 2, you will get 2 units of currency B (mb). 
MBA The currency market in country B where people buy or sell units of 
currency B (mb) with prices quoted in terms of currency A (ma). 
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